The relative majority rule and the unanimity rule are characterized for the case in which there are only two alternatives. The main axioms are motivated by a principle of binary representativeness: the aggregation of the preferences of n voters is the result of splitting the n voters into two groups, aggregating the preferences of the voters of each group, selecting for each group a representative that adopts the preference of the group, and finally aggregating the preferences of the two representatives. The two characterizations are shown to differ from each other in just one axiom, expressing strategyproofness (unanimity) or group strategyproofness (majority).
Introduction
A collective decision can be considered democratic when the decision has enough support in the collective. When there are only two alternatives α and β involved, one may define α to have enough support if more individuals prefer α to β than β to α. This definition leads to the relative majority rule as a source for democratic decisions.
Characterizations of this rule for the case of two alternatives have been provided by, for instance, May (1952, p. 682) , Fishburn (1973, p. 58) , Aşan and Sanver (2002, p. 411) , Woeginger (2003, p. 91; 2005, p. 9) , Miroiu (2004, p. 362) and Xu and Zhong (2009) 
Going from one extreme to the other, one may define α to have enough support only if it has maximum support. The adoption of this principle leads to the unanimity rule. In between, there are the different versions of the absolute majority rule, where enough support means having the support of some percentage p > 50% of the individuals; see Llamazares (2006) and Houy (2007) for characterizations of absolute majority rules.
This paper provides characterizations of both the relative majority rule and the unanimity rule. Conceptually, the characterizations hinge on the principle of representative democracy, which is understood in the sense that the preference of a collective I can be obtained by aggregating the preferences of subgroups of the collective. It is also worth noticing that the two characterizations (see Proposition 3.8) differ from each other in just one axiom: whereas the specific axiom for the relative majority rule is a group strategyproof condition, it is an individual strategyproof property for the unanimity rule.
Definitions and axioms
Members of the set ℕ of natural numbers are names for individuals. A society is a finite non-empty subset of ℕ. The alternatives are α and β ≠ α. A preference over {α, β} is represented by a number from the set {−1, 0, 1}. If the number is 1, α is preferred to β; if −1, β is preferred to α; if 0, α is indifferent to β. A preference profile for society I is a function x I : I → {−1, 0, 1} assigning a preference over {α, β} to each member of I. For x I ∈ X, J ⊆ I and i ∈ I, x J is the restriction of x I to J and x i abbreviates x I (i). For n ∈ ℕ, X n is the set of all preference profiles x I such that I has n members. The set X is the set of all preference profiles x I such that I is a society. For I = {i, j}, a ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, (a i , b j ) is the member x I of X 2 such that x i = a and x j = b.
Definition 2.1. A social welfare function is a mapping f : X → {−1, 0, 1}.
−3−
A social welfare function takes as input the preferences over {α, β} of all the members of any given society I and outputs a collective preference over {α, β}. Specifically, for x I ∈ X: (i) f(x I ) = 1 means that, according to f, society I prefers α to β; (ii) f(x I ) = −1, that society I prefers β to α; and (iii) f(x I ) = 0, that society I is indifferent between α and β.
For x I ∈ X and a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, n a (x I ) is the number of members of the set {i ∈ I: x i = a}.
Definition 2.2. The relative majority rule is the social welfare function μ : X → {−1, 0, 1} such that, for all x I ∈ X:
Definition 2.3. The unanimity rule is the social welfare function υ :
Definition 2.4. Given a social welfare function f and x I ∈ X\X 1 , the preference f(x I ) is:
(i) determinable by representatives of two subsocieties if, for some subsociety J of I, j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J, f(
(ii) determined by representatives of two subsocieties if, for every subsociety J of I, there are j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J such that f(
When f(x I ) is determinable by two representatives, the preference f(x I ) can be explained as arising from the aggregation of preferences of two individuals representing two subsocieties (or districts) J and I\J. When f(x I ) is determined by two representatives, the preference f(x I ) is obtained no matter the subsocieties chosen.
SPD. Strict preference is determinable by two representatives. For all
is determinable by representatives of two subsocieties. 
IND. Indifference is determined by two representatives. For all
x I ∈ X\X 1 , if f(x I ) = 0, then f(x I ) is determined
Results
Remark 3.1. μ satisfies SPD and IND.
As regards SPD, if x I ∈ X\X 1 and μ(
Remark 3.2. υ satisfies SPD and IND.
Since υ(x I ) = a ≠ 0 implies that, for all i ∈ I, x i = a, it is evident that υ satisfies SPD.
Concerning IND, let x I ∈ X\X 1 and υ(x I ) = 0. Choose J ⊂ I, j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J. To prove that IND holds, it is enough to show that {υ(
If, for all i ∈ I, x i ≠ 0, then there must be j ∈ I and k ∈ I\{j} such that x j = 1 and
1}. Proof. "⇒" Remark 3.1. "⇐" Taking the fact that f = μ on X 1 ∪ … ∪ X k as the base case of an induction argument, choose n > k and, arguing inductively, suppose that f = μ
Case 2: μ(x I ) = a ≠ 0. As μ(x I ) = a, there is k ∈ I such that x k = a. By definition of μ, μ(x I\{k} ) ∈ {0, a}. Suppose f(x I ) = 0. By IND, for every J ⊂ I, there are j ∈ I and i ∈ I\J
contradiction. In view of this, f(x I ) ∈ {a, −a}.
By definition of μ, −a ∈ {μ(x I\J ), μ(x J )}. Without loss of generality, suppose that μ(x J ) = −a. This implies n −a (x J ) > n a (x J ). Since μ(x I ) = a, n a (x I ) > n −a (x I ). As a result, n −a (x I\J ) < n a (x I\J ), which means that μ(
Lemma 3.4. With k ≥ 2, let f be a social welfare function such that f = υ on X 1 ∪ … ∪ X k . Then f = υ if and only if f satisfies SPD and IND.
Proof. "⇒" Remark 3.2. "⇐" Taking the fact that f = υ on X 1 ∪ … ∪ X k as the base case of an induction argument, choose n > k and, arguing inductively, suppose that f = υ
As a consequence, f(x I ) = a = υ(x I ).
Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 suggest that, given SPD and IND, the differences between unanimity and relative majority can be traced back to the way they aggregate preferences in societies with one or two individuals. In particular, any characterization of δ ∈ {μ, υ} on X 1 ∪ X 2 combined with SPD and IND will characterize δ. The results presented next make use of this possibility. and a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, if, for all i ∈ I, x i ∈ {a, 0} and, for some i ∈ I, x i = a, then f(x I ) = a.
VET 2 . No veto power for societies with two members. For all x I ∈ X 2 and a ∈ {1, −1}, if
The condition VET 2 of no veto power is equivalent to Xu and Zhong's (2009) simple equal treatment condition.
−6− Given a social welfare function f, society I and a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, define π a (I) to be the number of preference profiles x I such that f(x I ) = a. Proof. "⇒" It is not difficult to verify that μ satisfies PAR 2 , FET 2 and VET 2 . "⇐" By SSP 2 . Strong strategy-proofness for societies with two members. For all x I ∈ X 2 and i ∈ I, there is no a ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that ⏐f(
GSP 2 . Group strategy-proofness for societies with two members. For all x I ∈ X 2 , there is no y I ∈ X 2 such that, for all i ∈ I with x i ≠ 0, ⏐f( Proof. (i) "⇒" It is not difficult to verify that μ satisfies UNA 2 , EQA 2 , DIC 2 , and GSP 2 .
"⇐" By UNA 2 , for all a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}, f(
(ii) "⇒" It is not difficult to verify that υ satisfies UNA 2 , EQA 2 , DIC 2 , and SSP 2 . "⇐"
By UNA 2 , for all a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, i ∈ ℕ and j ∈ ℕ\{i}, f( Proof. Lemmas 3.3, 3.4 and 3.7.
Proposition 3.8 establishes that, given SPD, IND, UNA 2 , EQA 2 and DIC 2 , the choice between majority and unanimity can be reduced to the choice between, respectively, the group strategyproofness requirement GSP 2 and the individual strategyproofness condition SSP 2 (which is qualified as strong because an indifferent individual is presumed to be interested in having the collective preference to be indifference). It is somewhat paradoxical that GSP 2 , a sort of "cooperative" axiom, yields the majority rule, which is not particularly cooperative in that not much consensus is needed to reach a decision. On the other hand, the rather "non-cooperative" axiom SSP 2 , yields the unanimity rule, which is the quintessential cooperative rule, as overall consensus is necessary to reach a decision.
